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ARTICLES
ARE THERE UNIVERSAL STANDARDS FOR
NETWORK NEUTRALITY?†
Arturo J. Carrillo**

ABSTRACT
The regulation of the Internet in general, and network neutrality in particular,
has become a priority for many governments around the globe. The United States is
no exception. It enacted new rules protecting net neutrality in 2015 and then
famously undid them in 2017. Other countries similarly struggle to regulate net
neutrality effectively, including Brazil, India and those that comprise the European
Union. Most national debates of net neutrality policy tend to be fractious affairs.
There is deep disagreement surrounding the best way to approach the issue. In
previous work, I have shown how the design and implementation of net neutrality
norms by States can lead to more coherent, just, and sustainable policies when they
are guided by universally-recognized human rights norms. This Article advances
that thesis by identifying which human rights norms apply to net neutrality across
the board and explaining how those norms fully address the most critical issues at
the heart of net neutrality policy debates everywhere. These include: defining the
content and scope of net neutrality; promoting Internet access to help close the
digital divide; and regulating zero-rating, among others. To substantiate the novel
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claim that universal standards govern net neutrality, this Article engages in a
comparative analysis of the major human rights legal frameworks erected by the
United Nations, the Organization of American States (“OAS”), and Europe. It also
surveys the practice of States that have adopted some form of net neutrality
regulations to date. These comparative studies reveal a significant degree of
normative convergence suggesting that standards have begun to crystallize, at least
with respect to the basic definitional elements of net neutrality. The Article concludes
by explaining why the existence of universal standards for net neutrality matters to
and in the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
The regulation of the Internet in general, and network neutrality in particular,
has become a priority for many governments around the globe. The United States is
no exception. It enacted new rules protecting net neutrality in 2015 and then
famously undid them in 2017.1 Other countries similarly struggle to regulate net
neutrality effectively, including Brazil, India and those that comprise the European
Union, generating intense controversy in their respective domestic arenas. Most
national debates of net neutrality policy tend to be fractious affairs, revolving around
the economic, technical and political consequences of regulating Internet traffic. Net
neutrality is widely recognized as the idea that network providers must treat all data
and content online equally to promote the widest possible access to information.2
There is, however, deep disagreement surrounding the best way to implement this
principle. The resulting discord has led many policymakers, digital rights activists,
tech company representatives, and academics all over the world to ask whether
universal standards governing net neutrality exist or could exist.3
In prior work, I have shown that international law offers a framework of human
rights norms that can and should be applied to analyzing basic network neutrality
issues like zero-rating.4 I have further posited that the design and implementation of
net neutrality norms by governments can lead to more coherent, just, and sustainable
policies when they are guided by universally recognized human rights norms.5 This
Article advances the underlying thesis in this prior work—that human rights law is
the natural and best source of universal net neutrality standards—by showing why it
holds true today anywhere in the world. That is, I will identify which human rights
norms apply to net neutrality across the board and explain how those norms fully
address the most critical issues at the heart of net neutrality policy debates

1

Klint Finley, The Wired Guide to Net Neutrality, WIRED (May 9, 2018), https://www.wired.com/
story/guide-net-neutrality/?mbid=GuideCarveLeft.

2
Frank La Rue (U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion & Expression), Dunja Mijatović (OSCE
Representative on Freedom of the Media), Catalina Botero Marino (OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom
of Expression) & Faith Pansy Tlakula (ACHPR Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression & Access
to Information), Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression on the Internet, ¶ 5(a), OSCE (June 1, 2011)
[hereinafter Joint Declaration].
3

Arturo J. Carrillo, Zero Rating and The Holy Grail: Universal Standards for Net Neutrality, in NET
NEUTRALITY RELOADED: ZERO RATING, SPECIALISED SERVICES, AD BLOCKING AND TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT 86, 86 (Luca Belli ed., 2016) [hereinafter Carrillo, Holy Grail].
4

See generally Arturo J. Carrillo, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too? Zero-Rating, Net Neutrality and
International Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 364 (2016) [hereinafter Carrillo, Having Your Cake and
Eating It Too].

5

Carrillo, Holy Grail, supra note 3, at 100.
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everywhere. These issues include the definition, content and scope of net neutrality;
promoting Internet access—“connectivity”—to help close the digital divide;
fostering media diversity; and regulating zero-rating as well as reasonable network
management measures, among others.
These questions have enormous implications for any society, including the
United States. They are of special significance in developing countries, where the
majority of the population does not yet enjoy meaningful access to the Internet. In
exploring them, this Article will proceed as follows. In Part I, I first engage in a
comparative study of the major human rights legal regimes erected by the United
Nations, the Organization of American States (“OAS”), and Europe to map the status
of transnational normative development in relation to net neutrality. It turns out each
of these frameworks is configured to protect net neutrality as human rights norms
intrinsically linked to freedom of expression and non-discrimination guarantees. The
final section of Part I lays out the results of a comparative law survey of national
jurisdictions that claim to regulate net neutrality in some fashion. It focuses on the
legislation of States that have adopted some form of net neutrality regulations to date,
and seems to reflect a trend towards high-level convergence on the domestic plane.
Though still a work in progress, this survey, when viewed alongside the preceding
study of transnational legal regimes, tends to confirm that there is a significant
overlap in regulatory approaches to net neutrality worldwide.
In Part II, I will analyze the results of the transnational and national
comparative law studies from Part I to identify cross-cutting principles and norms
that increasingly constitute a set of universal standards applicable to network
neutrality. This analysis will reveal not just a significant degree of convergence
across legal systems and jurisdictions, but also the nature of that convergence. Such
standards seemed to have begun to crystalize at least with respect to a number of the
basic definitional elements of net neutrality. While issues remain, the overlapping
outcomes of the two meta-studies of net neutrality regulation effectively demonstrate
why the international human rights legal framework has been, and will continue to
be, the best suited to orienting policy-making in this area.
I conclude in Part III by explaining why the existence of universal standards
for net neutrality matters to the United States. It is not just because our government
is bound by its international legal obligations to protect net neutrality, and thus can
be held liable for failing to do so. These universal standards matter, inter alia,
because the emergence of the normative convergence that underpins them at both the
transnational and national levels is a testament to the transcendent nature of the basic
values embodied in the principle of net neutrality as promoted and protected by
human rights law. What emerges from this concluding Part is not just a clearer
picture of the universal standards that already apply to net neutrality as a norm of
human rights in the United States and around the world. The greater lesson may be
the way in which these standards can be used to constructively orient the definition,

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2019.654
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3458383

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE | 6 | VOL. 80 | 2019

design and implementation of that vital principle in the United States as well as all
other countries.

I.

INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW AND NETWORK
NEUTRALITY

This Part begins with an overview of the standards in the United Nations’, InterAmerican, and European human rights and legal systems that relate to the principle
of net neutrality. These systems correspond to Sections A, B, and C, respectively. In
the course of summarizing the pertinent norms from each of these transnational
regimes, I will make reference to case study examples that show how some of those
standards play out in practice. The final section of this first part is dedicated to
summarizing the results to date of an ongoing comparative law study of national
jurisdictions that have regulated net neutrality in some way. In this way, we examine
both sides of the net neutrality coin in contemporary international and comparative
law.

A.

United Nations Human Rights System

Network neutrality is a consolidated norm of international human rights law
due in large part to the seminal role it plays in protecting freedom of expression and
non-discrimination rights in the framework created under the auspices of the United
Nations. The UN regime is commonly referred to as the “universal” human rights
system, and for good reason. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”) has been signed and ratified by over 85% of the world’s states,
and encompasses nearly 80% of the world’s population.6 Its core principles apply to
nearly all countries on the planet.7 When discussing human rights online, the UN
framework is the place to start. This is due not just to its (near) universal coverage,
but also because, as we shall see, United Nations experts and authorities engaged in
its development have expressly extended the framework’s application to the digital
realm in three key areas: freedom of expression, non-discrimination, and exceptions
to these rights.

6

See Status of Ratifications Interactive Dashboard, UNITED NATIONS OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER ON
HUM. RTS., http://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
7

See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and
International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 289 (1996). The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights can be considered a source of customary international law for core norms like freedom of
expression, which applies to all UN member States regardless of whether they have ratified the ICCPR or
not.
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1.

Freedom of Expression

Article 19 of the ICCPR affirms the right “to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or
in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of . . . choice.”8 Freedom of
expression enjoys near universal acceptance worldwide, not the least because it is an
enabler of several other basic human rights. These include not just the corollary
rights to hold opinions and religious beliefs without interference, but several others
as well, such as the rights to education, freedom of association and assembly, to full
participation in social, cultural and political life, and to social and economic
development.9
Traditionally, freedom of expression under the ICCPR is comprised of four
constituent elements, beginning with the right to impart and express information on
the one hand, and the right to seek and receive information on the other.10 The other
two conventional elements are media rights, including media diversity, and the right
to access to information from public bodies.11 With the rise of electronic
communications, this framework was obliged to evolve in at least two ways. First,
the traditional rights comprising freedom of expression were deemed to apply to
“internet-based modes of communication.”12 This greatly expanded their protective
writ to cover all forms of online expression. Second, the exercise of freedom of
expression in the digital age, it can be argued, gave rise to two new constituent
elements: the right to connect to Internet, and the free flow of information once
online.13
It was in this context that net neutrality came to be recognized as an integral
part of the human rights law framework. In 2011, international experts on freedom
of expression from the United Nations, the OAS, and other regional human rights
systems jointly declared that “[t]here should be no discrimination in the treatment of

8

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].

9
Frank La Rue (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Report on
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc.
A/66/290 (Aug. 11, 2011) [hereinafter La Rue, SR Report 2011].
10
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, paras. 11, 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34
(Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter HRC, General Comment No. 34].
11

Id.

12

Id. ¶ 12.

13

See infra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
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Internet data and traffic, based on the device, content, author, origin and/or
destination of the content, service or application.”14 Thus, net neutrality became
integrated with human rights law. The U.N. Human Rights Committee took this
integration one step further by recognizing that “[a]ny restrictions on the operation
of websites, blogs or any other internet-based, electronic or other such information
dissemination system, including systems to support such communication, such as
internet service providers or search engines, are only permissible to the extent that
they are compatible with [the exceptions regime set out in] paragraph 3 [of Article
19].”15
Within the U.N. system, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and
Expression has further clarified the function of net neutrality in ensuring human
rights online, highlighting the critical role of private actors in this context:
In the digital age, the freedom to choose among information sources is meaningful
only when Internet content and applications of all kinds are transmitted without
undue discrimination or interference by non-State actors, including providers. The
State’s positive duty to promote freedom of expression argues strongly for
network neutrality in order to promote the widest possible non-discriminatory
access to information.16

As important as net neutrality is in ensuring the free flow of information online, it
can only do so once connectivity, or access to the Internet, is established. This is why
the Special Rapporteur has emphasized the “positive obligation [on governments] to
promote . . . the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression and the means
necessary to exercise this right, which includes the Internet.”17 Put simply, this
means that “[g]iving effect to the right to freedom of expression imposes an
obligation on States to promote universal access to the Internet.”18 You cannot have
one without the other.

14

Joint Declaration, supra note 2, ¶ 5(a).

15
HRC, General Comment No. 34, supra note 10, ¶ 43; this regime is discussed in more detail below; see
infra notes 37–58 and accompanying text.
16

David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Report on
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/35/22 (Mar. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Kaye, SR Report 2017].

17

La Rue, SR Report 2011, supra note 9, ¶ 61 (emphasis added).

18

Joint Declaration, supra note 2, ¶ 6(a).
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In this same vein, the UN General Assembly, in declaring that “the same rights
that people have offline must also be protected online, in particular freedom of
expression,” also recognized “the importance of applying [such] a human rightsbased approach in providing and in expanding access to Internet.”19 This approach
includes not only the aforementioned obligation to promote universal access to the
Internet, but also the duty “to ensure that persons are protected from any acts by
private persons or entities [such as ISPs] that would impair the enjoyment of the
freedoms of opinion and expression.”20 In other words, private actors who engage in
blocking, throttling or other degradation of the free flow of information online in
violation of net neutrality principles are interfering with the affected users’ right to
freedom of expression.
In short, network neutrality, together with connectivity, is “essential” to
realizing freedom of expression online in all of its dimensions, especially those
relating to the rights to seek, receive and impart information or ideas of all kind
freely.21 As noted, media diversity is another key dimension. This is “the degree to
which [a variety of] opinions are represented in the media.”22 Governments are
obligated to promote media diversity as a means “to protect the rights of media
users . . . to receive a wide range of information and ideas.”23 This concept is itself
closely related to, but distinct from, that of media pluralism, which is the structural
dimension media understood as the manifestation of a wide range of outlets and
sources for information, especially news.24 The UN Human Rights Committee has
stated that:
because of the development of modern mass media, effective measures are
necessary to prevent such control of the media as would interfere with the right of
everyone to freedom of expression. The State should not have monopoly control

19

Human Rights Council Res. 32/13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/L.20, paras. 1, 5 (June 27, 2016).

20

HRC, General Comment No. 34, supra note 10, ¶ 7.

21

See La Rue, SR Report 2011, supra note 9, ¶ 61.

22
Reporters Without Borders, 2018 World Press Freedom Index Detailed Methodology: Criteria
Categories and Indicators, https://rsf.org/en/detailed-methodology (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
23

HRC, General Comment No. 34, supra note 10, ¶ 14.

24

Ambeyi Ligabo (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression), Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 21 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/14 (Mar. 7,
2008); see also Arturo J. Carrillo et al., Supplemental Statement on Net Neutrality and Media Diversity,
GEO. WASH. LAW INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, Feb. 7, 2018, at 1, 2–3 [hereinafter Carrillo, Statement].
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over the media and should promote plurality of the media. Consequently, States
parties should take appropriate action . . . to prevent undue media dominance or
concentration by privately controlled media groups in monopolistic situations that
may be harmful to a diversity of sources and views.25

Although the interplay of media pluralism and diversity with net neutrality is
manifest, there has been relatively little research done to date on analyzing the nexus
between them, with a few significant exceptions.26 Suffice it to say for purposes of
this study that net neutrality is as essential to safeguarding media plurality and
diversity in practice as it is in guaranteeing the enjoyment of the other better known
dimensions of freedom of expression described above. Among other reasons, this is
because net neutrality guarantees equal access to the Internet for all media outlets,
sources and users, regardless of their size, content or resources, which ensures a freer
flow of information online.27

2.

Non-discrimination

Net neutrality is a norm of non-discrimination at heart.28 On this point, the
ICCPR establishes in Article 2 that State parties are obligated “to respect and to
ensure to all individuals within [their] territory and subject to [their] jurisdiction the
[human] rights recognized . . . without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.”29
What counts as “other status” for purposes of determining which additional
distinctions might lead to negative (or positive) discrimination is in open question.
What is certain is that international human rights law recognizes distinctions based
on economic status or criteria, and evaluates whether their purpose or effect is to
nullify or impair the exercise or enjoyment of other human rights.30 This is the reason

25

HRC, General Comment No. 34, supra note 10, ¶ 40 (emphasis added).

26
See Daniel O’Maley & Amba Kak, Free Internet and the Cost to Media Pluralism: The Hazards of
Zero-rating the News, CTR. FOR INT’L MEDIA ASSISTANCE (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.cima.ned.org/
publication/zero-rating-the-news/; see also Carrillo, Statement, supra note 24.
27

See Carrillo, Statement, supra note 24, at 4.

28

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

29

ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 2.

30

Erlingur Sveinn Haraldsson & Orn Snaevar Sveinsson, Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland, ¶ 10.2,
Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/91/D/1306/2004 (Dec. 14, 2007).
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why proposed restrictions on net neutrality like zero-rating, which offers free
preferential access to parts of the Internet, must be examined closely to evaluate their
impact on the exercise of freedom of expression.
To the extent that network neutrality is understood as a principle of nondiscrimination applied to users’ rights to seek, receive or impart data or information
online, it meshes organically with the core non-discrimination norms of international
human rights law. But not all discrimination is per se illegal: international law
differentiates between negative and positive types: The “principle of equality
sometimes requires States [sic] parties to take affirmative action in order to diminish
or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited
[by international law].”31 For this reason, “[n]ot every differentiation of treatment
will constitute [unlawful] discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are
reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate
under [international law].”32 In other words, positive or affirmative discrimination
can be an exceptional measure that enhances or increases the overall exercise and
enjoyment of human rights.
A good example of such positive discrimination may be zero-rating, which is
when Internet service providers (“ISPs”) permit data usage under limited
circumstances without charging for it or counting it against data caps, a practice some
supporters say may promote greater access to the Internet.33 Zero-rating, however,
has many critics because it is a discriminatory restriction on network neutrality that,
as we have seen, is part and parcel of the rights to freedom of expression and nondiscrimination. Under most circumstances, zero-rating would, thus, be prohibited.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur has come out against “paid prioritization,” or the
creation of fast lanes on the Internet by network providers, observing that the
“hierarchy of data [created] undermines user choice.”34 Similarly, the Rapporteur
takes a skeptical view of zero-rating as a policy for expanding connectivity, noting
that “[t]he assumption that limited access will eventually ripen into full connectivity
requires further study. It may be dependent upon factors such as user behavior,
market conditions, the human rights landscape and the regulatory environment.”35

31
U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, ¶ 10, OHCHR (Nov. 10, 1989) [hereinafter
HRC, General Comment No. 18].
32

Id. ¶ 13.

33

See generally Carrillo, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, supra note 4, at 418–27.

34

Kaye, SR Report 2017, supra note 16, ¶ 24.

35

Id. ¶ 27.
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This debate matters because as we have seen, States are bound to ensure that all
people within their territory have equal access to the Internet.36

3.

The Exceptions Regime

It is for these reasons that Article 19.3 of the ICCPR expressly permits certain
restrictions on the right to freedom of expression when necessary to “respect of the
rights or reputations of others,” or to advance “the protection of national security, or
of public order . . . , or of public health or morals.”37 These are, generally speaking,
the legitimate aims that may be invoked by States seeking to impose limits on
fundamental human rights, including expression.38 In addition to pursuing a
legitimate goal, a State seeking to curtail freedom of expression (or any human right
for that matter) must ensure that the measures doing so are “provided by law,”
“necessary” to meet the stated aim, and “proportional.”39 Such restrictions should be
enacted into formal law through a transparent and participatory political process.40
In any case, such laws “must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an
individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly”; they must also be accessible
to the public.41
Assuming that a State’s goal is to advance a legitimate aim recognized by
international human rights law, a proposed restriction on freedom of expression like
zero-rating, to be permissible, must not only be provided by law but also be necessary
and proportional in relation to that goal.42 To be “necessary,” legally enacted limits
must be “directly related to [meeting] the specific need on which they are
predicated,” i.e. they must be effective at doing what they are intended to do.43 A
restriction is not indispensable, and thus, “violates the test of necessity[,] if the
protection could be achieved in other ways that do not restrict freedom of

36

La Rue, SR Report 2011, supra note 9, ¶ 61.

37

ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 19(3).

38

Catalina Botero Marino (Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights), Freedom of Expression and the Internet, ¶ 28, OAS, U.N. Doc.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. (Dec. 31, 2013) [hereinafter Freedom of Expression and the Internet].
39

HRC, General Comment No. 34, supra note 10, paras. 24, 33–34; ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 19(3).

40

Freedom of Expression and the Internet, supra note 38, paras. 81–83.

41

HRC, General Comment No. 34, supra note 10, ¶ 25.

42

Id. ¶ 22.

43

Id.
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expression.”44 Finally, any steps taken by States to limit expression, even if
legitimate and necessary, cannot be “overbroad.”45 Proportionate measures are those
that are “appropriate to achieve their protective function” and “the least intrusive . . .
amongst those [available].”46 These restrictions are meant to set a high bar for
recognizing a small set of narrowly tailored measures.47
In other words, returning to my original example, whether or not a zero-rating
practice can be a permissible restriction on net neutrality, and thus freedom of
expression, is a fact-specific and context driven question. Let me give an example of
how this plays out in practice: Zambia. In a nutshell, permitting a zero-rated platform
like Facebook’s Internet.org to operate in a country with a deep digital divide and
poor infrastructure like Zambia most likely advances, rather than violates, that
country’s human rights commitments. This will occur so long as the platform’s
characteristics do not render its deployment unnecessary (because there are better
alternatives) or overbroad (because it discriminates inappropriately or unfairly) in
relation to the access goals pursued.48
India is another more high-profile example of how UN norms could and should
apply in practice to the regulation of net neutrality. Indian regulators in 2015
confronted intense social backlash over so-called “zero-rating” plans offered by local
mobile operators.49 The spark was an Indian telecom joining forces with Facebook
in early 2015 to roll out Internet.org, the latter’s online platform (now called “Free
Basics”), with the stated objective of advancing connectivity in the developing
world.50 Among other things, Internet.org offered limited access to a bundle of select

44

Id. ¶ 33.

45

Id. ¶ 34.

46

Id.

47

See id. ¶ 35.

48

Carrillo, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, supra note 4, at 424–26.

49

See Harichandan Arakali, Amazon, Facebook Square Off over Net Neutrality in India, INT’L BUS. TIMES
(Apr. 17, 2015, 12:57 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/amazon-facebook-square-over-net-neutrality-india1886050 [https://perma.cc/HHH4-4H5S].

50

Jon Russell, Facebook Takes Internet.org and Its Free Mobil Data Services to India, TECHCRUNCH
(Feb. 9, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/09/internet-org-india [https://perma.cc/G7Y8-RXER]; see
also Mariella Moon, ‘Free Basics by Facebook’ Replaces Internet.org Website and App, ENGADGET
(Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/09/24/free-basics-by-facebook [https://perma.cc/
9UEY-FHR5] (stating that “Free Basics” offers a menu of services and applications to users in Asia,
Africa and Latin America to choose from).
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online content and services free of charge.51 The roll out of Internet.org in February
of that year sparked waves of protest from Indian civil society and digital rights
activists around the world.52 They worried that Facebook, a for-profit, multi-national
corporation, would become through its Internet.org platform a “gatekeeper” to the
Internet for millions of mobile phone users in the developing world, with nefarious
consequences for local innovation, competition, and social development.53
In February 2016, India’s regulator chose to ban differential pricing, including
zero-rating by telecoms, but not net neutrality per se.54 Soon thereafter, the regulator
executed an embarrassing “flip-flop” by issuing two new consultations on the topic,55
which advocates believed might threaten to reintroduce zero-rating “through the
back door.”56 Ultimately, however, India ended up adopting a full set of net neutrality
rules in July 2018 rapidly deemed “the world’s strongest” because they
unambiguously protect against “any form of discrimination or interference in the
treatment of content.”57 The question remains whether India, in deciding to prohibit

51

Russell, supra note 50.

52

See, e.g., Open Letter to Mark Zuckerberg Regarding Internet.org, Net Neutrality, Privacy, and
Security, FACEBOOK (May 18, 2015, 6:34 AM), https://www.facebook.com/notes/accessnoworg/openletter-to-mark-zuckerberg-regarding-internetorg-net-neutrality-privacy-and-/935857379791271 [https://
perma.cc/DK58-36YX] [hereinafter Open Letter].

53
Id.; see also Mitchell Baker, Zero Rating and the Open Internet, LIZARD WRANGLING (May 6, 2015),
https://blog.lizardwrangler.com/2015/05/06/zero-rating-and-the-open-internet [https://perma.cc/592TM6A2].
54

See Annie Gowen, India Bans Facebook’s ‘Free’ Internet for the Poor, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/indian-telecom-regulator-bans-facebooks-free-internet-for-thepoor/2016/02/08/561fc6a7-e87d-429d-ab62-7cdec43f60ae_story.html [https://perma.cc/2CBQ-V8PB];
Jesse Hempel, India Bans Facebook’s Basics App to Support Net Neutrality, WIRED (Feb. 8, 2016,
12:52 PM), http://www.wired.com/2016/02/facebooks-free-basics-app-is-now-banned-in-india [https://
perma.cc/9BMY-3PZA].

55
Manu Kasuhik, TRAI’s Web of Confusion, BUS. TODAY (July 31, 2016), http://www.businesstoday.in/
magazine/focus/the-telecom-regulator-must-first-simplify-its-processes-before-dealing-with-netneutrality/story/234769.html [https://perma.cc/4L5P-T3X5].
56
Parminder Jeet Singh, Free Basics, Now Through the Back Door, THE HINDU (July 5, 2016), http://
www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/parminder-jeet-singh-india-and-facebook-free-basics-now-throughthe-backdoor/article8807948.ece [https://perma.cc/35QB-2Z22].
57

Rishi Iyengar, India now Has the ‘World’s Strongest’ Net Neutrality Rules, CNN (July 12, 2018,
12:10 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/07/12/technology/india-net-neutrality-rules-telecom/index
.html; see also Adi Robertson, India Just Approved Net Neutrality Rules that Ban ‘Any Form’ of
Discrimination, VERGE (July 11, 2018, 4:25 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/11/17562108/indiadepartment-of-telecommunications-trai-net-neutrality-proposal-approval.
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private sector zero-rating, is advancing its people’s human rights in compliance with
its international human rights obligations under the ICCPR. Given India’s yawning
digital divide, among other factors, the answer may be in the negative if the country
is not doing enough otherwise to ensure Internet access for the more than 800 million
Indians—two thirds of the country’s population—who still do not have it.58

B.

Inter-American Human Rights System

In a report published in 2014, the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression (“OAS Special Rapporteur”) affirmed that American Convention on
Human Rights Article 13 governing freedom of expression “applies fully to
communications, ideas and information distributed through the Internet.”59 Further
interpreting the American Convention, the OAS Special Rapporteur expressly
affirmed that respect for net neutrality “is a necessary condition for exercising
freedom of expression on the Internet pursuant to the terms of Article 13.”60 This is
because “[n]et neutrality is part of the original design of the Internet [and] is
fundamental for guaranteeing the plurality and diversity of the flow of
information.”61 As these statements indicate, the Inter-American human rights
system goes even further than its UN counterpart to address and protect net neutrality
principles in several important respects.
Article 13 of the American Convention follows Article 19 of the ICCPR in most
key respects, but differs positively in others that are worth highlighting. Like its UN
counterpart, Article 13 safeguards freedom of expression in all its dimensions and
establishes an exceptions regime that functions almost identically to the Article 19
version described above.62 American Convention Article 13 states in relevant part,
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other

58
India: Human Development Indicators, UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, http://hdr.undp.org/
en/countries/profiles/IND (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (indicating that less than 20% of India’s population
has Internet access of any kind); see Carrillo, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, supra note 4, at 428–
29.
59

Freedom of Expression and the Internet, supra note 38, ¶ 2 (citing Joint Declaration, supra note 2).

60

Id. ¶ 25.

61

Id. ¶¶ 27–28.

62

Id. ¶¶ 1–2, 52–72.
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medium of one’s choice.”63 But, it also adopts an express ban on “prior censorship,”
as well as on restrictions “by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of
government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or
equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending
to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.”64 In this same
vein, the American Convention articles which bar discrimination in the
implementation and safeguarding of the treaty’s rights expressly recognize unlawful
distinctions made on the basis of “economic status.”65 This, too, distinguishes the
Convention in contrast with its counterpart, the ICCPR.
It is difficult to overstate the significance of these normative protections for net
neutrality and freedom of expression in the Americas. Among the primary legal
consequences catalogued by the OAS Special Rapporteur for State parties to the
American Convention to comply with are the following:
●

Guarantee the effective implementation of the net neutrality principle
through “adequate legislation,” which should be “based on dialogue
among all actors . . . to maintain the basic characteristics of the
original environment, strengthening the Internet’s democratizing
capacity and fostering universal and nondiscriminatory access.”66

●

Ensure that persons’ “free access and user choice to use, send, receive
or offer any lawful content, application or service through the Internet
is not subject to conditions, or directed or restricted, such as blocking,
filtering or interference.”67

●

Guarantee that any restrictions to net neutrality and freedom of
expression “be established by law, formerly and in practice, and that

63
American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San José, Costa Rica art. 13(1), Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 036, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention on Human Rights].
64
Freedom of Expression and the Internet, supra note 38, ¶ 88; American Convention on Human Rights,
supra note 63, art. 13(3).
65

American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 63, arts. 1(1), 24.

66

Freedom of Expression and the Internet, supra note 38, paras. 11, 26, 177–80 (outlining Special
Rapporteur’s discussion of the principles that should guide Internet governance at the national level, which
contemplate multi-sectorial participation through democratic processes in the devising of Internet policies
and regulations).

67

Id. ¶ 25.
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the laws in question be clear.”68 Such restrictions must also advance a
legitimate State objective of the type listed in Article 13 paragraph 2,
which includes respecting the rights of others, and conform to basic
principles of necessity, proportionality and due process.69

68

Id. ¶ 58.

69

Id. ¶ 55.

70

Id. ¶ 58.

71

Id. ¶ 19.

●

Regulations or other implementing norms “that create uncertainty
with regard to the scope of the right protected and whose interpretation
could lead to arbitrary rulings that could arbitrarily compromise the
right to freedom of expression would [also] be incompatible with the
American Convention.”70

●

Protect media and other pluralism online by “ensuring that changes
are not made to the Internet that result in a reduction in the number of
voices and amount of content available [to] allow for the search for
and circulation of information and ideas of all kinds . . . pursuant to
the terms of Article 13 of the American Convention.”71 This is
necessary because media and other types of “pluralism and diversity
[are] essential conditions for public debate and the exercise of freedom
of expression [and therefore] must be preserved in the digital era.”72

●

Adopt measures necessary “to prevent or remove the illegitimate
restrictions to Internet access put in place by private parties and
corporations, such as policies that threaten net neutrality or foster
anticompetitive practices.”73

●

Respect and guarantee not just the individuals’ freedom of expression
rights, but also those of society as well.74 This “dual dimension”
inherent in the right to freedom of expression means that it is “both
the right to communicate to others one’s point of view and any
information or opinion desired, as well as the right of everyone to

72
Edison Lanza (OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression), Standards for a Free, Open and
Inclusive Internet, ¶ 8 U.N. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II (Mar. 15, 2017).
73

Freedom of Expression and the Internet, supra note 38, ¶ 51.

74

Id. ¶ 52.
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receive and hear those points of view, information, opinions, stories
and news, freely and without interference that would distort or block
it.”75
Mexico is a good example of how international standards can positively
influence the adoption of domestic norms protecting freedom of expression and net
neutrality. In 2013, Mexico approved a bill to amend its Political Constitution in the
area of telecommunications.76 In a prescriptive move that tracks the special
protections of American Convention Article 13.3, the Mexican legislature amended
Article 7 of the Constitution, which safeguards freedom of expression, to prohibit
restrictions of that right “by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of
government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or
equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means.”77 This
near verbatim incorporation of American Convention Article 13.3’s protections into
Mexican constitutional law has substantial implications for the ongoing policy
debates in that country around how best to define and regulate net neutrality, which
was codified but not defined by the Federal Telecommunications and Broadcasting
Law practices.78 This is especially true with respect to the widespread zero-rating
practices currently on display in Mexico that, on their face, would seem to contradict
the aforementioned constitutional protections as well as the country’s human rights
obligations.79
Colombia, on the other hand, has initiated a course of action that openly defies
OAS and UN standards on protecting net neutrality. The country has enacted
legislation that defines net neutrality and expressly claims to safeguard it.80 At the

75

Id. ¶ 35.

76

Id. ¶ 5.

77

Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CP, art. 7, Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 12-27-2013 (Arturo J. Carrillo trans.) (Mex.).
78

MARICARMEN SEQUERA, LIA HERNÁNDEZ, CARLOS BRITO, ANDRÉ DELGADO & VALERIA
BETANCOURT, KARISMA FOUNDATION, ¿CÓMO SE CONTRATA EN LATINOAMÉRICA EL ACCESO A
INTERNET? ¿QUÉ TIENE QUE VER ÉSTO CON LA NEUTRALIDAD DE LA RED? 48–49 (Arturo J. Carrillo
trans.) (2016) [hereinafter KARISMA FOUNDATION].
79

Id. at 48–51; PAULA JARAMILLO, EXAMINANDO LO DERECHOS Y LAS LIBERTADES EN INTERNET EN
LATINOAMÉRICA: INFORME CONSOLIDADO DE INVESTIGACIÓN (Arturo J. Carrillo trans.) (2016)
[hereinafter APC REPORT].
80

DERECHOS DIGITALES & INTERVOZES, NEUTRALIDAD DE RED EN AMÉRICA LATINA:
REGLAMENTACIÓN, APLICACIÓN DE LA LEY PERSPECTIVAS 36 (2017) [hereinafter NEUTRALIDAD DE RED
EN AMÉRICA LATINA].
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same time, however, that legislation raises serious questions, first, about whether the
definition is adequate, and second, whether the law’s implementation will conform
to international standards.
In 2011, Colombia enacted Law 1450 that seems to codify a strong concept of
net neutrality, one which expressly prohibits blocking, interfering, discriminating or
restricting Internet users’ rights to access, send, receive or publish any content,
application or service online.81 At the same time, however, it goes on to stipulate that
service providers can “make offers depending on the needs of market sectors or of
the providers’ subscribers according to their consumption and user profiles, which
shall not be construed as discrimination.”82 The implementing regulation makes
clear that the Law’s proviso authorizes plans that provide Internet access limited to
certain “generic” types of services, content or applications, so long as the service
providers offer plans with unlimited Internet access alongside those that would
restrict it.83 Karisma has correctly expressed concern that the conflicting language in
the law and implementing regulation threatens to undermine the net neutrality
provision and turn it into a “joke.”84 Accordingly, because Colombia is a monist
State, where international human rights law once ratified forms part of a
“constitutional bloc” of norms that can be directly invoked in Colombian courts, it
is not hard to see how this panorama could easily give rise to legal claims denouncing
Law 1450 on human rights grounds.85
Finally, Chile offers a telling example of the challenges to ensuring that
otherwise strong net neutrality protections in law are adequately enforced. Chile is
famous as the first country in the world to adopt a net neutrality law in 2010.86 At a
normative level, the Chilean Law’s provisions create a “blanket” bar to practices that
violate net neutrality, including zero-rating. It states that internet service providers
(“ISPs”) will not be able to arbitrarily block, interfere, discriminate, hinder or restrict
content, applications or legal services that users seek to transmit or access through

81

L. 1450, Junio 16, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.) (Arturo J. Carrillo trans.).

82

Id. (Arturo J. Carrillo trans.) (emphasis added).

83

KARISMA FOUNDATION, supra note 78, at 37.

84

Id.

85

CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 93 (Arturo J. Carrillo trans.).

86

Carrillo, Having your Cake and Eating It Too, supra note 4, at 398.
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their networks.87 The Law’s prohibition on discrimination was initially applied to
commonly zero-rated social media applications like Twitter, WhatsApp and
Facebook.88 In 2014, the Subsecretería de Telecomunicaciones de Chile (Subtel), the
telecommunications regulator, announced that such services were no longer allowed,
subjecting any company that utilized them to fines.89 Facebook’s Internet.org was
similarly shut down.90
Digital rights advocates in Chile welcomed this regulation on the grounds that
permitting zero-rated social media platforms was harmful to net neutrality “from a
technical, economic and legal perspective.”91 In practice, however, Chile’s net
neutrality law today only bans zero-rating by mobile operators of social media apps
and services offered as promotional or commercial schemes.92 Some forms of zerorating continue to exist or be permitted by Subtel, including zero-rated social media
platforms.93 Notably, in 2014 Subtel issued an opinion stating that Wikipedia Zero
did not violate the terms of the law, or Subtel’s interpretations of its net neutrality
protections.94 The result is normative dissonance, a situation where strong legal
protections are not consistently implemented or enforced by the competent
authorities, giving rise to potential human rights concerns.

C.

European Human Rights and Legal Systems

Europe contains three distinct but overlapping legal systems that address
network neutrality. These are the Council of Europe (“CoE”), which includes the

87
Consagra el Principio de Neutralidad en la Red Para Los Consumidores y Usuarios de Internet, General
de Telecomunicaciones Ley [Chilean Net Neutrality Law], 18.168, Art. 24 H(a) (Arturo J. Carrillo trans.)
(2010).
88
David Meyer, In Chile, Mobile Carriers Can No Longer Offer Free Twitter, Facebook or WhatsApp,
GIGAOM (May 28, 2014), https://gigaom.com/2014/05/28/in-chile-mobile-carriers-can-no-longer-offerfree-twitter-facebook-and-whatsapp.
89

Id.

90

CAROLINA ROSSINI & TAYLOR MOORE, EXPLORING ZERO-RATING CHALLENGES: VIEWS FROM FIVE
COUNTRIES, A PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE WORKING PAPER 17–18 (2015).
91

Francisco Vera Hott, ¿Es Deseable Tener Excepciones a la Neutralidad de la Red?, DERECHOS
DIGITALES (Arturo J. Carrillo trans.) (Oct. 1, 2014), https://derechosdigitales.org/7929/wikipedia-zeroen-chile-es-deseable-tener-excepciones-la-neutralidad-en-la-red/.
92

ROSSINI & MOORE, supra note 90, at 18–20.

93
See, e.g., Social Networks, CLAROCHILE, http://www.clarochile.cl/portal/cl/pc/personas/movil/redessociales/#04-redes-sociales-en-tu-plan (Arturo J. Carrillo trans.) (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
94

ROSSINI & MOORE, supra note 90, at 19–20.
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European Court of Human Rights; the European Union (“EU”) and its specialized
judicial bodies, including the Court of Justice for the EU; and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (“OSCE”). I will focus on the first two because
they establish frameworks of legally binding norms for Member States.

1.

The Council of Europe

The Council of Europe is an intergovernmental organization founded in 1949,
which currently has forty-seven Member States (including all twenty-eight EU
Member States).95 It was set up to promote democracy and protect human rights and
the rule of law in Europe.96 It should not be mistaken for the European Union, or one
of the bodies of the European Union (such as the European Council, which is the
highest policy-making body of the EU), although the two organizations have a close
relationship.97 To join the CoE, Member States must accept the principles of the rule
of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and
fundamental freedoms; they must also pledge to collaborate sincerely and effectively
with the CoE’s efforts to secure the maintenance and further realization of human
rights and fundamental freedoms.98 In this vein, all CoE Member States have ratified
the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) (not to be mistaken for the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the European Court of Human Rights (a different body from the European Court of
Justice).99
The Council of Europe has a number of bodies that act to protect and promote
human rights, but its principal organs are the Committee of Ministers, the
Parliamentary Assembly, the Secretariat, and the European Court of Human Rights

95

Our Member States, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/our-member-states (last
visited Apr. 2, 2019).

96
What We Do, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/values (last visited June 10,
2019).
97
Do Not Get Confused, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/do-not-get-confused
(explaining the differences between different European Institutions) (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
98
Statute of the Council of Europe, arts. 1, 3, May 6, 1949, E.T.S. No. 1, http://www.coe.int/en/web/
conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680306052 [hereinafter Statute of the Council of
Europe].
99
Eur. Consult. Ass., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Doc. No. 5, art. 8 (1950) [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights]; About Us, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/whowe-are (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
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(“ECtHR”).100 The Committee of Ministers, made up of either the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of each Member State or the permanent diplomatic representative of
those States in Strasbourg, is the CoE’s main decision-making body.101 Article 15(b)
of the Statute of the Council of Europe authorizes the Committee of Ministers to
formulate formal written “recommendations” to Member State governments and
may request that they inform the CoE of any actions taken to implement and/or
comply with it terms.102 Thus, although these recommendations are not technically
binding, there is a clear expectation that Member States take them into account,
especially when legislating or regulating on the topic addressed.
The Committee of Ministers has adopted a number of “declarations” and
“recommendations” recognizing the importance of protecting freedom of expression
on the Internet.103 Most notably, in January 2016, the Committee of Ministers
adopted Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)1 on protecting and promoting the right to
freedom of expression and the right to private life with regard to network
neutrality.104 This Recommendation recognizes net neutrality as a principle that:
underpins non-discriminatory treatment of Internet traffic and the users’ right to
receive and impart information and to use services of their choice. It reinforces
the full exercise and enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression because

100
Structure, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/structure (last visited June 10,
2019).
101

Committee of Ministers, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/en/web/cm (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).

102

Statute of the Council of Europe, supra note 98, art. 15.

103

See Eur. Council Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)(3) of the Committee to
Member States on the Remit of Public Service Media in the Information Society, 985th Sess.,
CM/Rec(2007)3 (2007); Eur. Council Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)16 on
Measures to Promote the Public Service Value of the Internet, 1010th Sess., CM/Rec(2007)16 (2007)
[hereinafter Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)16]; Eur. Council Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation
CM/Rec(2008)6 on Measures to Promote Respect for Freedom of Expression and Information with
Regard to Internet Filters, 1022nd Sess., CM/Rec(2008)6 (2008) [hereinafter Recommendation
CM/Rec(2008)6]; Eur. Council Comm. of Ministers, Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on
Network Neutrality, 1094th Sess. (Sept. 29, 2010); Eur. Council Comm. of Ministers, Declaration by the
Committee of Ministers on Internet Governance Principles, 1121st Sess. (Sept. 21, 2011); Eur. Council
Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)6 to Member States on a Guide to Human Rights
for Internet Users, 1197th Sess., CM/Rec(2014)6 (2014).
104

Eur. Council Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)1 of the Committee of Ministers to
Member States on Protecting and Promoting the Right to Freedom of Expression and the Right to Private
Life with Regard to Network Neutrality, 1244th Sess., CM/Rec(2016)1 (2016) [hereinafter
Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)1].
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Article 10 of the [European] Convention [on Human Rights] applies not only to
the content of information but also to the means of its dissemination.105

With respect to network neutrality, Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)1’s central
provisions are as follows:
1. General Principles
1.1 Internet users have the right to freedom of expression, including the right to
receive and impart information, by using services, applications and devices of
their choice, in full compliance with Article 10 of the [European] Convention [on
Human Rights]. These rights must be enjoyed without discrimination on any
ground such as gender, sexual orientation, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.106
1.2. Internet users’ right to receive and impart information should not be restricted
by means of blocking, slowing down, degrading or discriminating Internet traffic
associated with particular content, services, applications or devices, or traffic
associated with services provided on the basis of exclusive arrangements or
tariffs.107
(. . .)
2. Equal treatment of Internet traffic
2.1. Internet traffic should be treated equally, without discrimination, restriction
or interference irrespective of the sender, receiver, content, application, service or
device. This is understood as the network neutrality principle for the purpose of
this recommendation. The network neutrality principle applies to all Internet
access services irrespective of the infrastructure or the network used for the
Internet connection and regardless of the underlying technology used to transmit
signals.108

EU Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)1 further highlights an underappreciated aspect
of network neutrality: its impact on the right to private and family life as articulated

105

Id. ¶ 4.

106

Id. Appendix.

107

Id.

108

Id.

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2019.654
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3458383

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
PAGE | 24 | VOL. 80 | 2019

in the European Convention on Human Rights.109 Specifically, it provides guidelines
stating that:
the use of Internet traffic management techniques that are capable of assessing the
content of communications is an interference with the right to respect for private
and family life. Therefore, such use must be fully in line with Article 8 of the
Convention, be tested against applicable legislation on the right to private life and
personal data protection and reviewed by a competent authority within each
member State in order to assess compliance with legislation.110

It should be emphasized that the declarations and recommendations issued by
the Council of Ministers are subsequently implemented by Member States directly,
or cited and used by the other principal EU organs in their work, most notably the
European Court of Human Rights.111 For example, the ECtHR, in its judgment in the
case of Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey,112 referred to the CoE’s declarations113 and
recommendations114 addressing digital rights when determining the standards to
apply under European Convention Article 10 on freedom of expression. In the end,
the Court found a violation of Article 10 due to a Turkish court’s decision in a
criminal proceeding to block all websites hosted by Google Sites, instead of just
blocking the allegedly unlawful site at issue.115 This illustrates one of the main
mechanisms through which the Committee of Ministers achieves the progressive

109

European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99, art. 8.

110

Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)1, supra note 104.

111

See Committee of Ministers, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/cm (last visited June 10,
2019).

112

Yildirim v. Turkey, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 6–8 (2013).

113

Eur. Council Comm. of Ministers, Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on Human Rights and
the Rule of Law in the Information Society, CM(2005)56 (May 13, 2005); Eur. Council Comm. of
Ministers, Declaration on Freedom of Communication on the Internet Adopted by the Committee of
Ministers, 840th Sess. (May 28, 2003).
114
Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)16, supra note 103; Eur. Council Comm. of Ministers,
Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)11 on Promoting Freedom of Expression and Information in the New
Information and Communications Environment, 1005th Sess., CM/Rec(2007)11 (2007); Eur. Council
Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)6, supra note 103; Eur. Council Comm. of
Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)3 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the
Protection of Human Rights with Regard to Search Engines, 1139th Sess., CM/Rec(2012)3 (2012).
115

Yildirim v. Turkey, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 51.
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realization of human rights: the CoE articulates and elaborates standards, which the
ECtHR subsequently adopts and applies in its case law.

a.

European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)

The European Court of Human Rights interprets and applies the European
Convention on Human Rights; as such, it plays a central role in regulating
transnational freedom of expression on the continent.116 Like its ICCPR and
American Convention counterparts, Article 10 of the European Convention includes
within its scope the right to receive and impart information: “Everyone has the right
to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers.”117 In this regard, “the [European] Court has held that in
the light of its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts
of information, the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public’s access
to news and facilitating the dissemination of information in general.”118 It has also
established that Article 10 “applies not only to the content of information but also to
the means of dissemination, since any restriction imposed on the latter necessarily
interferes with the right to receive and impart information.”119
With respect to human rights online, a leading ECtHR case is the
aforementioned Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey. There, the Court found that the State
violated Article 10’s guarantees when a Turkish court ordered the wholesale
blocking of access to the Google Sites website hosting service, in order to ensure
that, as the result of a criminal sanction, a designated website, which allegedly
offended the memory of Atatürk, was rendered inaccessible.120 The Court deemed
this measure to be overbroad, arbitrary and unnecessary because it blocked public
access to all the websites hosted by Google Sites, including that of the applicant, who
owned a different website from the offending one at issue.121 The ECtHR employed
similar reasoning in another case from Turkey to find a violation of Article 10

116
See Structure, supra note 100; European Court of Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/ home.aspx?p=home&c= (last visited June 10, 2019).
117

European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99, art. 10.

118
Times Newspapers Ltd. v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), 2009-I Eur. Ct. H.R ¶ 27; Yildirim,
2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 48.
119

Yildirim, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 50; Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, 2015-2 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 56.

120

Yildirim, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 68.

121

Id. ¶¶ 65–66.
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resulting from a blanket order blocking all access to YouTube because the website
was found to be hosting particular videos that allegedly insulted the memory of
Atatürk in violation of local law.122
In 2016, the ECtHR found that Estonia’s refusal to provide access to two staterun online databases and the Council of Europe website for legal research constituted
a violation of a prisoner’s Article 10 right to receive information via the Internet.123
The ECtHR emphasized that this decision arose against the factual background of
Estonia granting prisoners limited access to the Internet, and could not be interpreted
as imposing a general obligation to provide access to the Internet, or to specific
Internet sites, for prisoners.124 Finally, the ECtHR has determined that the “duties
and responsibilities” to be imposed on an Internet news portal for the purposes of
Article 10 may differ to some degree from those of a traditional publisher with
regards to third-party content.125 This determination was based on the
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member States on “a new notion
of media,” which urges the adoption of a graduated and differentiated response to
Internet actors.126
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to
freedom of expression, subject to narrow exceptions. Paragraph 2 of Article 10 states
that:
The exercise of [this] freedom[], since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the

122

Cengiz and Others, 2015-2 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 57.

123
Kalda v. Estonia, 2016-II Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 43, 54. The websites at issue were those of the Chancellor
of Justice and the Estonian Parliament; the prisoner wanted to access legal opinions (Chancellor of Justice)
and draft laws, explanatory memoranda, records and minutes of sittings (Estonian Parliament). Id. ¶¶ 10,
50.
124

Kalda v. Estonia, 2016-II Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 45, 48.

125

Delfi AS v. Estonia, App. No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 113 (2015).

126

Eur. Council Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)7 of the Committee of Ministers
to member states on a new notion of media, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Sept. 21, 2011),
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/ result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805cc2c0.
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reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.127

The exceptions regime outlined in this provision has been interpreted strictly
by the ECtHR in the light of the essential role of freedom of expression in a
democratic society; accordingly, measures limiting freedom of expression must be
justified by a “pressing social need.”128 As noted above, the ECtHR has held that
Article 10 covers Internet communications,129 and that restrictions on Internet access
can thus constitute a violation of Article 10.130 While the ECtHR has not yet directly
addressed network neutrality per se, it seems clear that the Court’s eventual approach
to that issue will be shaped by its existing jurisprudence as well as the
aforementioned declarations and recommendations of the Committee of Ministers,
which have done so.

2.

European Union

The European Union (“EU”) is an economic and political union consisting of
twenty-eight Member States,131 founded on the values of respect for human dignity,
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including
the rights of persons belonging to minorities.132 The principal organs of the EU
include the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Commission,
and the Court of Justice for the European Union.133 When the Lisbon Treaty entered
into force in December 2009, it brought with it the recognition of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which was deemed to possess the same
legal status as the Treaties on European Union.134 The “Treaties on European Union”

127

European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99.

128

Delfi AS, App. No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 131.

129

Times Newspapers Ltd., 2009-I, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 27; Yildirim, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 48; Delfi, App.
No. 64569/09 ¶ 110.
130

Yildirim, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 54.

131

EU Member Countries in Brief, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/
member-countries_en (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).

132

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, pmbl., 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391 [hereinafter CFR].

133

See EU Institutions and Other Bodies, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/
institutions-bodies_en#a-unique-institutional-set-up (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).

134
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 2, 2008 O.J. (C
115) 47 [hereinafter Consolidated TFEU]; CFR, supra note 132, art. 6.
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is the collective name given to the constitutive treaties establishing the European
Union, which include the Treaties that created the Union and the Treaties that amend
or supplement those.135 These include the Rome Treaty Establishing The European
Economic Community (1957); the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, 1993; the
Treaty of Amsterdam, 1999; Treaty of Nice, 2003; and the Lisbon Treaty of 2007
(which entered into force in 2009).
The Rome Treaty, as presently amended, is the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (“TFEU”); while the Maastricht Treaty, as presently amended,
is the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”).136 As noted, Article 6 of the TEU gives
the Charter of Fundamental Rights the same legal value as the TEU, which means
that EU Member States, by ratifying the Lisbon Treaty or acceding to the EU, are
deemed to recognize the Charter of Fundamental Rights as applying to the
interpretation of EU law, to EU actors, and to Member States when they are
implementing EU law.137
The Charter of Fundamental Rights is a different treaty from the European
Convention on Human Rights. It contains fifty rights (where the European
Convention on Human Rights only has fourteen), including rights such as “the
freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law and national laws and
practices” (Article 16), “the right to protection of personal data” (Article 8), a general
principle of non-discrimination (Article 21), and a guarantee that “Union policies
shall ensure a high level of consumer protection” (Article 38).138 Regarding freedom
of expression, Charter Article 11 establishes that: “1. Everyone has the right to
freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers. 2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be
respected.”139
Unlike other international human rights instruments, the text of the Charter
does not distinguish between absolute and qualified rights, as is evident from the

135

T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 87 (2013).

136

See EU Treaties, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/law/treaties_en.

137

HARTLEY, supra note 135, at 157–58.

138

See CFR, supra note 132.

139

Id. art. 11.
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verbatim reproduction of the text of Article 11. Instead, it includes a general
limitations clause in Article 52, paragraph 1, which reads as follows:
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and
freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.140

In addition, the general limitation clause sets out a rule in Article 52(3) designed to
prevent conflict between Charter rights and European Convention rights that
correspond to each other by providing for the meaning and scope of a given Charter
right to be the same as the corresponding Convention right, while preserving the
possibility of EU law providing more extensive protection.141 The interpretation and
enforcement of the Charter are the province of EU courts such as the Court of Justice
of the European Union (“CJEU”), but not the European Court of Human Rights,
which enforces the European Convention.142 Importantly, the question of any
integrated relationship between the two regional courts remains unresolved to date
due to the CJEU’s refusal to find that the accession of the EU to the ECHR is
compatible with the EU treaties.143

a.

EU Regulation 2015/2120 and the BEREC
Guidelines

In June 2015, the European Union passed EU Regulation 2015/2120, which
sets out measures concerning open Internet access, including the principle of network

140

Id. art. 52(1).

141

Id. art. 52(3) (scope and interpretation of rights and principles).
3. Insofar as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed
by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those
laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law
providing more extensive protection . . . .

Id.
142

See Institutions and bodies, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/ institutionsbodies_en (last visited June 10, 2019); see also supra note 116 and accompanying text.

143

Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice, Accession by the Union to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454 (Dec. 18, 2014).
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neutrality.144 Regulation 2015/2120 is a compromise text between the European
Parliament (which was in favor of strong network neutrality protections) and the
European Commission and European Council (which were initially less inclined
towards strong network neutrality protections).145 The self-proclaimed purpose of
this Regulation is to “establish[] common rules to safeguard equal and nondiscriminatory treatment of traffic in the provision of internet access services and
related end-users’ rights.”146 It did so in Article 3, by providing for robust network
neutrality protections in the following terms:
1. End-users shall have the right to access and distribute information and content,
use and provide applications and services, and use terminal equipment of their
choice, irrespective of the end-user’s or provider’s location or the location, origin
or destination of the information, content, application or service, via their internet
access service . . . .
3. Providers of internet access services shall treat all traffic equally, when
providing internet access services, without discrimination, restriction or
interference, and irrespective of the sender and receiver, the content accessed or
distributed, the applications or services used or provided, or the terminal
equipment used.147

In addition, EU Regulation 2015/2120 prescribes detailed transparency
measures in Article 4 and for national regulatory authorities to closely monitor and
ensure compliance with Articles 3 and 4 in Article 5.148 As context, Recital (33) of
the Regulation references five community values that must be protected and balanced
by national regulatory authorities in determining compliance with Articles 3 and 4:
(1) the protection of personal data [Charter, Article 8]; (2) freedom of expression and
information [Charter, Article 1]; (3) freedom to conduct a business [Charter, Article
16]; (4) non-discrimination [Charter, Article 21] and (5) consumer protection

144
Eur. Parl. Ass. & Eur. Council, Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 November 2015 Laying Down Measures Concerning Open Internet Access and Amending
Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal Service and Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic Communications
Networks and Services and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on Roaming on Public Mobile Communications
Networks within the Union, 2015 O.J. (L 310) [hereinafter EU Regulation].
145

Net neutrality wins in Europe!, EUR. DIGITAL RTS. (Aug. 29, 2016), https://edri.org/net-neutralitywins-europe/.

146

EU Regulation, supra note 144, art. 1(1).

147

Id. art. 3.

148

Id. arts. 4–5.
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[Charter, Article 38].149 As noted, Regulation 2015/2120 prioritizes the twin aims of
establishing common rules to safeguard equal and non-discriminatory treatment of
traffic in the provision of internet access services and related end-users’ rights, and
protecting end-users while simultaneously guaranteeing the continued functioning of
the internet ecosystem as an engine of innovation.150
It is also worth noting that Article 8 of Regulation 2015/2120 amends Article 1
of Directive 2002/22/EC (on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic
communications networks and services), replacing paragraph 3 as follows:
National measures regarding end-users’ access to, or use of, services and
applications through electronic communications networks shall respect the
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, including in relation to
privacy and due process, as defined in Article 6 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

This has the effect of introducing human rights protections into an older EU measure
designed to ensure universal service in electronic communications networks, thereby
ensuring that the human rights standards of protection are the same for both the EU
Regulation 2015/2120 and Directive 2002/22/EC.
In order to promote a consistent application by Member States of the EU,
Regulation 2015/2120 tasked the Body of European Regulators of Electronic
Communications (“BEREC”) with issuing guidelines for the implementation of the
obligations of national regulatory authorities under Article 5, after consultation with
stakeholders and in close cooperation with the European Commission.151 BEREC
produced its much anticipated Guidelines in August 2016.152 These Guidelines set
out recommended interpretations of each of the Regulation’s Articles in light of their
respective recitals, which the national regulatory authorities are expected to follow.

149
Id. ¶ 33; CFR, supra note 132, arts. 1, 8, 16, 21, 38. Recital (33) states that “[t]his Regulation respects
the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter, notably the
protection of personal data, the freedom of expression and information, the freedom to conduct a business,
non-discrimination and consumer protection.” EU Regulation, supra note 144, ¶ 33.
150

EU Regulation, supra note 144.

151

Id. art. 5(3).

152

Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications [BEREC], BEREC Guidelines on the
Implementation by National Regulators of European Net Neutrality Rules, at 1, Doc. No. BoR (16) 127
(2016) [hereinafter BEREC Guidelines].
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Significantly, they start by reaffirming Regulation 2015/2120’s aim to “safeguard
equal and non-discriminatory treatment of traffic” and “related end-user’s rights.”153
Taken together, Regulation 2015/2120 and the BEREC Guidelines provide
strong protection for network neutrality through the recognition of nondiscrimination and freedom of expression rights, among others.154 Both the EU
Regulation and the Guidelines integrate core human rights standards into the
normative and implementation frameworks for network neutrality in all its
dimensions. Thus, the Guidelines confirm that the “Regulation observes the
fundamental rights of, and the principles recognised in the Charter, notably the
protection of personal data, the freedom of expression and information, the freedom
to conduct a business, non-discrimination and consumer protection.”155 Furthermore,
with regards to discussing possible restrictions to net neutrality, Regulation
2015/2120 expressly references the exceptions regimes of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights in Recital
(13).156 Recital (13) provides that:
The requirement to comply with Union law [imposed by the Regulation on EU
Member States] relates, inter alia, to the compliance with the requirements of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”) in relation
to limitations on the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms. As provided in
Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, any
measures liable to restrict those fundamental rights or freedoms are only to be
imposed if they are appropriate, proportionate and necessary within a democratic
society, and if their implementation is subject to adequate procedural safeguards
in conformity with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, including its provisions on effective judicial
protection and due process.157

In this vein, EU Regulation 2015/2120’s Article 3(2) provides that agreements
between ISPs and end-users on commercial and technical conditions, as well as on
the characteristics of Internet access services such as price, data volumes or speed,

153

Id. ¶ 3.

154

Id. ¶ 20; see also EU Regulation, supra note 144, paras. 13, 33.

155

BEREC Guidelines, supra note 152, paras. 20.

156

EU Regulation, supra note 144, ¶ 13.

157

Id.
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are permitted, provided that such agreements and commercial practices do not limit
the exercise of the end-users’ rights laid down in Article 3(1).158 In light of this
framework, the BEREC Guidelines are obliged to address zero-rating as “a
commercial practice . . . which could have different effects on end-users and the open
internet, and hence on the end-user rights protected under the Regulation.”159
Accordingly, while not prohibiting zero-rating, the Guidelines require the
comprehensive assessment on a case-by-case basis of differential pricing practices
to determine when and if they limit the exercise of the end-users’ rights laid down in
Article 3(1) in relation to freedom of expression and information, as well as media
pluralism.160
Finally, the BEREC Guidelines apply the human rights framework outlined in
Regulation 2015/2120’s Recital (13) to the interpretation of Article 3(3)(a) regarding
the adoption of reasonable traffic management measures.161 The effect of these
provisions is to limit the circumstances under which non-reasonable traffic
management measures can be required by law. They ensure that any such limits be
compatible with fundamental rights and freedoms, meaning they can only be
imposed if appropriate, proportionate and necessary within a democratic society.162
At the same time, their implementation must conform to the procedural safeguards
consecrated in the “European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, including the provisions on effective judicial protection and
due process.”163 This ensures that non-reasonable traffic management measures

158

Id. arts. 3(1)–3(2); see also id. ¶ 7; BEREC Guidelines, supra note 152, ¶ 30.

159

BEREC Guidelines, supra note 152, ¶ 40.

160

Id. ¶ 46, n.13.

161

Id. paras. 81–82. The BEREC Guidelines provide:
If an ISP applies traffic management measures which cannot be regarded as
reasonable, NRAs should assess whether an ISP does so because it has to do
so for legal reasons, namely to comply with the legislation or measures by
public authorities specified in that exception. As explained in Recital 13, such
legislation or measures must comply with the requirements of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, and notably Article 52 which states in particular that any
limitation of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter must be
provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.

Id.
162

Id.

163

Id.
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required by law must be compatible with human rights, and can be challenged by
affected persons.
A 2019 report by a European nonprofit watchdog organization, partially
sponsored by Mozilla, raises important questions about the effectiveness of the
current EU regime for net neutrality in protecting that principle in practice.164 In
particular, it finds that in the two-and-a-half years since the BEREC Guidelines were
adopted, most EU Member States permit widespread differential pricing practices
(e.g., zero-rating) that negatively impact the European digital single market and
users’ privacy rights, among others.165 The authors of the report further bemoan the
lack of uniform interpretation and enforcement by national regulators of key BEREC
standards in relation to these and other abuses of net neutrality in many of the EU
Member States.166

D. Comparative Law Study of Net Neutrality Regulation
Since early 2018, my students in the George Washington University Law
School International Human Rights Clinic and I have carried out a study of net
neutrality laws worldwide to better understand which countries have legislated on
the subject and in what terms. The results are attached in Annex A: Comparative
Law Study of Net Neutrality Regulations Around the World (hereinafter Comparative
NN Table). This research has been based largely, but not exclusively, on the “Zero
Rating Map,” a wiki compiled by the UN IGF Dynamic Coalition on Network
Neutrality and coordinated by Professor Luca Belli.167 Our research in preparing the
Table was also informed by the wide consultation of online databases as well as a
thorough review of secondary sources and specialized literature. When deciphering
a country’s net neutrality norms, we consulted primary sources whenever possible,
including official regulatory and legislative databases.
The Comparative NN Table presents information on a total of fifty-three
countries. This number encompasses all countries we could find that possess express

164

See generally EPICENTER.WORKS, THE NET NEUTRALITY SITUATION IN THE EU: EVALUATION OF THE
FIRST TWO YEARS OF ENFORCEMENT (2019).
165

Id. at 16.

166
Id. at 19–21; see also iwona, Net Neutrality to the Test—How Free Is Our Internet?,
EPICENTER.WORKS (Jan. 29, 2019), https://epicenter.works/content/netzneutralitaet-in-europa-aufdem-pruefstand-wie-frei-ist-unser-internet.
167
U.N. IGF Dynamic Coalition on Net Neutrality, Zero Rating Map, TABLEAU, https://public
.tableau.com/profile/zeroratingcts#!/vizhome/zeroratinginfo/Painel1 (last visited Apr. 6, 2019).

ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2019.654
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3458383

UNIVERSAL STANDARDS FOR NETWORK NEUTRALITY
PAGE | 35

net neutrality regulation. In addition, it includes a number of States that do not yet
have discernible net neutrality norms but are nonetheless reference points due to their
political importance and/or large populations, like the United States and China.
Finally, the Table lists a handful countries lacking net neutrality norms that are
nevertheless considered relevant as indicative of regional practice or because they
are beacons in the ICT sector, such as South Africa and Israel.168 Sources for the
Table can be accessed by clicking on the digital tabs provided for each entry. The
entries in the Table are sorted by region: North and Central America, Europe, South
America, Africa, Asia and Middle East.169
Collectively, the goal is to provide a high-level overview of which States
possess net neutrality norms globally and the basic elements they cover. To this end,
the Table is organized around five columns of information for each entry. The first
is whether the State possesses net neutrality rules at all. The next three columns
deepen the inquiry by capturing whether, if the State does regulate net neutrality,
those norms prohibit blocking, throttling, or differential pricing of online services or
sources, respectively. The final column is for comments to clarify the prior entries
where needed, as well as to provide links to the sources consulted. For instance, we
use this column to highlight the extent to which the 28 EU countries’ respective
implementation of the 2015 EU Regulation conforms to the standards enunciated in
2016 by BEREC, especially in relation to zero-rating practices like paid
prioritization.

1.

NN Comparative Law Study Findings

A reading of the Comparative NN Table displays some interesting numbers. It
shows that at least forty-six countries around the world today possess legal norms
regulating net neutrality in some manner, twenty-eight of which are the Member
States of the European Union subject to EU Regulation 2015/2120.170 An additional
nine are from Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru) while two are from Scandinavia (Norway and
Finland). India and Singapore are the only two Asian countries to address net

168

See infra, Annex A.

169

See infra, Annex A.

170
See infra, Annex A. The EU countries are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden and the UK. EU Member Countries in Brief, supra note 131.
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neutrality in their law. The remaining States rounding out the tally are Canada,
Turkey, Russia, Switzerland, Tunisia and Israel.
Of the forty-six States we identified expressly regulating net neutrality in some
form, virtually all expressly prohibit blocking of websites, information and services,
save for three (93%).171 One exception is Mexico, which has not yet defined net
neutrality in its law; the other two are Costa Rica and Tunisia, where some net
neutrality protection has been realized via judicial decision, leaving its more general
normative parameters unclear. Similarly, our study found that all but four States with
net neutrality norms on the books have expressly prohibited throttling (91%). The
first three exceptions are Mexico, Costa Rica and Tunisia, for the reasons just stated;
the fourth is Peru, whose law authorizes throttling under certain circumstances.172
With respect to differential pricing, only eight States prohibit this practice
either expressly or through a judicial or regulator’s decision (less than 20%). Those
countries are Canada, Italy, Slovenia, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Tunisia and India. It
is interesting to note that three of the eight countries to do so are Latin American.
Tellingly, however, enforcement of this prohibition even in States with strong
normative frameworks tends to be weak: Brazil and Chile are prime examples of this
tendency.173 Another region illustrating the difficulty in practice of restricting
differential pricing, especially paid prioritization, is the European Union. In the EU,
otherwise strong net neutrality protections are subject to a narrow exception for
differential pricing in commercial settings.174 As noted, EU Member States have
adopted inconsistent approaches to dealing with these practices in their respective
territories, giving rise to a troubling hodge-podge of deficient regulatory action with
respect to the widespread practice of zero-rating generally.175

II. UNIVERSAL NET NEUTRALITY STANDARDS
In this final Part, I will conduct a comparative analysis of the international and
domestic legal systems surveyed to identify the extent of overlap in their ambits with
respect to net neutrality. I begin by focusing on the transnational regimes described
supra in Sections A, B and C to contrast the content and scope of their respective net
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See infra, Annex A.

172

See infra, Annex A.

173

See NEUTRALIDAD DE RED EN AMÉRICA LATINA, supra note 80, at 18, 68; see also Christopher T.
Marsden, Comparative Case Studies in Implementing Net Neutrality: A Critical Study of Zero Rating,
SCRIPTED, Apr. 2016, at 1.
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See supra notes 158–66 and accompanying text.

175

See supra notes 164–69 and accompanying text.
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neutrality standards, as well as the legal status of those norms. Then, after contrasting
the content, scope and legal nature of the various net neutrality rules that operate in
the UN, OAS and European systems, I will compare the frameworks governing
permissible restrictions to those same norms with special attention paid to zerorating. Finally, I will identify other relevant but unexplored issues arising from the
comparative analyses of the three regimes studied to flag them for future analysis.
These regional and international legal systems share a number of important
characteristics among them; they differ in significant ways as well. One
characteristic they share is that of being a “moving target”: each is constantly
evolving, making any comparative exercise a provisional one at best. That said, this
comparative study makes possible the identification of influential, high-level trends
in the development and protection of net neutrality norms at an inter-governmental
level. At the same time, it also makes possible the opportunity to cross-reference
these high-level trends with those taking place within countries that regulate of net
neutrality in some form, which was the subject of Section D supra. Accordingly, I
will fold into the discussion the relevant findings of the comparative law study of
State practice relating to net neutrality.

A.

Content, Scope and Nature of Net Neutrality Norms

There seems to be few substantive differences between the definitions of
network neutrality in the European legal systems, where it has received the most
attention, and those advanced by the UN and OAS human rights frameworks. A
review of the latter two human rights systems indicates that, although the normative
content of their network neutrality protections may not be as fulsome as those
enacted in Europe, their approach to protecting net neutrality as a norm of human
rights is substantially similar to Europe’s; thus, providing a strong foundation for
comparative analysis.
The levels of prescriptive content with respect to net neutrality are high in the
European context and, for the time being, relatively uniform. On the one hand, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has set out human rights-infused
standards protecting net neutrality per se in Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)1,
which were transcribed above.176 Not surprisingly, these standards largely mirror
those previously adopted by the European Union in the EU Regulation also discussed
above.177 On the other, the BEREC Guidelines expressly ensure that the EU
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See supra notes 105–12 and accompanying text.

177

See supra notes 147–54 and accompanying text.
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Regulation is interpreted with maximum respect for the human rights norms of the
Fundamental Charter and the European Convention.178 Although this apparent
consensus appears to be fraying in practice as Member States act to comply with
their international obligations, at least with respect to differential pricing and zerorating in particular,179 Europe nonetheless has set the benchmark against which other
transnational and national approaches must be compared.
As in Europe, both the UN and OAS systems have embraced a definition of net
neutrality that is framed in human rights terms. In these systems, the definition of net
neutrality is that first expressed by international experts in the 2011 Joint
Declaration on Freedom of Expression on the Internet: “[t]here should be no
discrimination in the treatment of Internet data and traffic, based on the device,
content, author, origin and/or destination of the content, service or application.”180
That basic definition reflects the consensus view of the regional experts on freedom
of expression from the UN, the OAS, the OSCE, and the African Union who issued
the Joint Declaration. It was further developed in the Inter-American context by the
OAS Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression in two reports: Report on Freedom of
Expression and the Internet, published in 2014, and Standards for a Free, Open and
Inclusive Internet, in 2017.181
In the 2014 Report, the OAS Rapporteur elaborated on the definition from the
Joint Declaration by explaining that “[t]he purpose of this principle is to ensure that
free access and user choice to use, send, receive or offer any lawful content,
application or service through the Internet is not subject to conditions, or directed or
restricted, such as blocking, filtering or interference.”182 Consequently, as noted in
Part I.B., supra, the Rapporteur recognized that net neutrality is today “a necessary
condition for exercising freedom of expression on the Internet pursuant to the terms
of [American Convention] Article 13.”183 Additionally, Article 13, of course, like
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See supra notes 152–58 and accompanying text.

179

See supra notes 164–69 and accompanying text.

180

Joint Declaration, supra note 2, ¶ 5(a).

181

See Freedom of Expression and the Internet, supra note 38, paras. 25–33; see also supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
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Id. ¶ 25.
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Article 19(2) of the ICCPR, is a facsimile in relevant part of Article 10 of the
European Convention and Article 11 of the European Charter.184
For this reason, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression was able
to build on the 2011 Joint Declaration definition of net neutrality, subsequently
declaring in 2017 that “[t]he State’s positive duty to promote freedom of expression
argues strongly for network neutrality in order to promote the widest possible nondiscriminatory access to information.”185 In other words, there can be no doubt that
the same core values of non-discrimination and freedom of expression that underpin
network neutrality in Europe and the Americas have meshed perfectly with the
corresponding rights enunciated in ICCPR Articles 2 and 19, thereby transforming
that principle into an integral component of the ICCPR’s legal regime.186 For these
reasons, one can confidently affirm that “the concept of a data-neutral network based
on the ‘end-to-end’ principle, as well as the term net neutrality itself, have been
largely ‘uploaded’ into [UN] human rights law and discourse.”187
In light of the foregoing, then, one can be certain that the definitional core of
net neutrality integrated into UN human rights law tracks that of the operative
definitions prevailing in Europe and the Americas. Moreover, the same definitional
elements are largely reproduced at the level of State practice, at least with respect to
the application of the principle of non-discrimination to the treatment of data online
as embodied by the widely prevalent prohibitions on blocking and throttling. State
practice in relation to differential pricing and zero rating, however, is much less
uniform. Thus, despite the vociferous affirmations of net neutrality purists to the
contrary, it cannot be said that the definitional core of net neutrality reflected in inter-

184

See supra notes 8, 62–63, 117, 139 and accompanying text. Clearly there is a substantial amount of
cross-fertilization and cross-referencing that occurs between the different systems. For example, the OAS
Rapporteur in the 2013 Report on Freedom of Expression and the Internet made explicit reference to the
leading European instrument addressing network neutrality at the time, namely, the Declaration of the
Committee of Ministers on network neutrality, of September 29, 2010. See Freedom of Expression and
the Internet, supra note 38. This Declaration, in turn, was the basis for the subsequent CoM
Recommendation and the EU Regulation that followed. It is likely that as the principle of net neutrality is
further examined by UN and OAS procedures and mechanisms, they will continue to build on the
reinforced foundation laid by Europe in this respect.
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Kaye, SR Report 2017, supra note 16, ¶ 23.
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See supra Part I.A; see also Carrillo, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, supra note 4, at Part III.A
(describing how net neutrality came to be an integral part of international human rights law); Joint
Declaration, supra note 2, ¶ 6(a); Human Rights Council Res. 20/8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/L.13, ¶ 1
(June 29, 2012).
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governmental and State practice to date includes a blanket prohibition on zero-rating
practices. Finally, as will be explained below, the remaining piece of the definitional
puzzle relates to defining limits: any exceptions enacted by governments to net
neutrality protections should follow the same strict rules that apply to enacting
restrictions on the enjoyment of freedom of expression, non-discrimination and other
fundamental human rights.
Deeper variances between the different systems are reflected not in the
normative content of net neutrality norms, but rather in the legal status of those
norms and the extent to which they are binding on Member States. The EU
Regulation establishes “obligations to closely monitor and ensure compliance [by
EU Member States] with the rules to safeguard equal and non-discriminatory
treatment of traffic in the provision of internet access services and related end-users
rights as laid down in Articles 3 and 4.”188 And, while the BEREC Guidelines are
formally “recommendations” to national regulatory authorities (“NRA”) on how to
implement said Articles of the Regulation, NRAs are urged to “take utmost account”
of them.189 It is unlikely that a State could act counter to the dictates of the
Guidelines, and still be deemed in compliance with the underlying Regulation.
The EU is a highly developed legal and regulatory regime which creates
explicit obligations regarding net neutrality that are binding on Member States and
enforceable by a suite of political and judicial mechanisms, including the CJEU.190
The Council of Europe is a parallel and overlapping regime covering a broader
geographic area than the EU.191 Although the declarations and recommendations of
the Committee of Ministers do not enjoy the same legal status as EU Regulations,
they are highly influential in shaping national policies and Member States are
expected to follow them.192 Moreover, as we have seen, they are a primary source of
guidance for the European Court of Human Rights when it addresses issues arising
under the Convention that deal with human rights online.193
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BEREC Guidelines, supra note 152.
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See supra Part I.C.2.
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See supra Part I.C.1.
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See supra notes 98–104 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text.
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In contrast to the European systems, the OAS and UN regimes studied have not
yet profited from net neutrality-specific norms that would directly or indirectly bind
their respective Member States. Rather, the legal obligations to enact net neutrality
protections and enforce compliance with them at the national level flow from the
duties incumbent on State Parties to the American Convention and the ICCPR,
respectively, to respect and ensure respect for freedom of expression in a nondiscriminatory manner (among other fundamental human rights).194
Though legal in nature, these derivative duties regarding net neutrality in the
OAS and UN systems are not as precisely defined as they are in the European
context; nor do they possess the sort of political foundation and institutional
legitimacy that a Council of Europe Committee of Minister’s Recommendation or a
Regulation of the European Union (meaning the European Parliament and Council)
have. The transnational enforcement mechanisms most likely to address network
neutrality issues outside of Europe in the near to mid-term are the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee. Both are
quasi-jurisdictional bodies whose findings and recommendations in contentious
cases are not binding as a technical matter on State Parties, even though they do carry
legal weight.

B.

Permissible Restrictions on Net Neutrality

The other major convergence confirmed by the survey of transnational legal
systems that address network neutrality surrounds the framework for defining
legitimate restrictions to that principle. No human right is absolute, and freedom of
expression is no exception: the ICCPR Article 19(3);195 American Convention
Article 13(2);196 European Convention Article 10(2);197 and Article 52(3) of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights,198 all set up narrow conditions under which States
can lawfully restrict freedom of expression. Because net neutrality is today an
integral component of freedom of expression rights, it is a norm protected under the
treaty-based human rights systems established by the United Nations, the OAS, and

194

See supra Parts I.A and I.B.

195

See ICCPR, supra note 8, art. 19(3); see also supra text accompanying note 7.

196
See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 63, art. 13(2); see also supra text
accompanying note 57.
197
See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99, art. 10(2); see also supra text
accompanying note 99.
198

See CFR, supra note 132, art. 52(3) and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying note
114.
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in Europe to advance those rights. Accordingly, the principle of net neutrality shares
not only a set of basic definitional elements, but is also subject to the exceptions
regimes established by each the respective legal frameworks of which it is part.
In all the contexts studied, there are clearly enunciated rules that States must
follow to lawfully restrict network neutrality and the human rights values it
embodies. Moreover, these rules are substantially the same: any such limitation must
be prescribed by law to further a legitimate State or social aim, and must be necessary
as well as proportional in achieving that end.199 While simply stated, this overarching
systemic formula is notoriously complicated to apply in practice, not least because it
is a heavily context-based and fact-dependent analysis.200 Even so, one can now see
why and how this specialized framework applies equally, for example, to evaluating
the lawfulness of reasonable traffic management measures in Europe,201 as it does to
establishing whether India’s net neutrality protections banning differential pricing
and private sector zero-rating practices comply with the country’s human rights
obligations under the ICCPR.202
A final point of clarification regarding the normative convergences identified
in this and the prior sub-section is required. As noted, it appears that net neutrality at
its core enjoys a relatively high level of shared definitional specificity around the
world, and that international human rights law provides a common normative
framework for addressing its realization and protection. But that does not mean that
in practice similar challenges or issues will necessarily lead to similar outcomes in
different countries around the globe. This is due to the special nature of the
exceptions regime in international law, which in any case can only be applied under
defined circumstances in a specific national context and in light of the specific facts
presented by a particular controversy.203 This means that, all else being equal, the
common standards for analyzing whether a given restriction on net neutrality, and
thus freedom of expression, is legitimate, will operate differently between politically
and economically advanced countries of the global North and a developing country
in Latin America, such as Asia or Africa.204 In other words, universal standards for
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See supra notes 192–98 and accompanying text.
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Carrillo, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too, supra note 4, at Part IV.
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See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 49–58 and accompanying text.
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net neutrality do not have to mean uniform outcomes in the application of those
standards to similar issues arising in different contexts.

C.

Other Issues

It is evident that the development of net neutrality standards in Europe is farther
along than it is in any of the other legal systems examined. In addition to the looming
challenge of how to address disparate State regulatory responses to widespread zerorating practices by ISPs,205 the European context gives rise to other interesting
questions regarding the implementation and enforcement of net neutrality standards.
The first has to do with EU Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)1’s highlighting of the
impact of net neutrality on the right to private and family life (ECHR Article 8).206
While digital rights advocates in other circumstances have raised privacy concerns
in relation to net neutrality,207 this is an issue that has not been explored to the same
extent as net neutrality’s key role has in the realization of freedom of expression.
This is especially true for the OAS and UN systems, though for slightly different
reasons.208 More work needs to be done on this front.
A second question from the European front flows from Article 16 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights, which enshrines the Right to Conduct a Business: “[t]he
freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law and national laws and
practices is recognised.”209 The issue here is whether an Internet access service
provider can challenge national laws or decisions of the national regulatory
authorities prohibiting the practice of zero-rating on the grounds that it violates the
ISP’s freedom to conduct a business. Though it is difficult to predict with any degree
of certainty, such a challenge would unlikely succeed because the freedom to conduct
a business can also be qualified under Article 52(3) of the Charter.210 A balancing of
the competing interests and values that a conflict between Article 16 and Article 11
on freedom of expression would create could well lead the CJEU or national
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See supra notes 164–69 and accompanying text.
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European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 99, art. 8.
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See, e.g., EPICENTER.WORKS, supra note 164; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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The OAS has a fuller development of net neutrality thanks to the Special Rapporteur’s 2013 and 2017
Reports, but as a system has an underdeveloped practice and analysis of privacy rights under the American
Convention on Human Rights. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 63. Conversely,
the UN human rights system has analyzed privacy rights extensively in relation to the ICCPR, but has not
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policymaker to decide in favor of ensuring equal and non-discriminatory treatment
of Internet traffic, given the robust net neutrality protections codified in EU and
European law.211
Another issue ripe for deeper exploration more generally is the nexus between
net neutrality, on the one hand, and media pluralism and diversity on the other. Early
studies suggest that a lack of net neutrality protections gives rise to the practice of
zero-rating news from select outlets and sources, which can work to the detriment of
smaller outlets and independent sources. This can reinforce the dominance of large
internet platforms as well as undermine media pluralism and diversity.212 Indeed,
motivated by these same concerns, Reporters Without Borders (RSF), a media
freedom advocacy group, has started to systematically examine the status of net
neutrality in the legal systems of the democratic countries in which it carries out its
Media Ownership Monitoring (MOM) project.213 The MOM project aims to bring
transparency and rigor to the study of media pluralism in the developing world by
identifying factors that contribute to the over or undue concentration of media
ownership.214 RSF has come to believe that weak or non-existent rules to guarantee
net neutrality may be such a factor.
Finally, regarding the comparative law study of national jurisdictions that
regulate net neutrality summarized in Part I.D.1 supra, there is similarly more to
explore. In addition to deepening the inquiry into each State’s legal framework for
net neutrality, further empirical research is needed around implementation and
enforcement: the practical impacts of net neutrality rules or their absence on the
enjoyment of fundamental rights. While numerous States have begun to address such
issues at a legislative and regulatory level, especially in Europe, no domestic or
international court, tribunal or other jurisdictional body to date has directly addressed
the issue of network neutrality as a function of freedom of expression, nondiscrimination and other human rights. But there are strong indications that once
such a case arises, whether in Europe or elsewhere, the pertinent jurisdictional body
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See id. arts. 11, 16. In its previous case law, the CJEU has found that the Article 11 right to receive
information can outweigh the Article 16 freedom to conduct a business, and that the Article 38 guarantee
of consumer protection can outweigh Article 16. See Case C‐283/11, Sky Österreich GmbH v.
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Ryanair Ltd., 2013 CURA (Jan. 31, 2013).
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will most likely reaffirm the principle’s integral role to promoting and protecting
such rights.

III. UNIVERSAL STANDARDS AND THE UNITED STATES
Even if there are universal standards for network neutrality, why should it
matter to policymakers and advocates in the United States? I have shown that such
standards are indeed crystalizing with respect to the basic definitional elements of
network neutrality as a principle of non-discrimination applied to the way people
access Internet data flows. At the same time, there is evidence of transnational
acceptance of the requirement that any restrictions on that principle as an integral
part of freedom of expression and non-discrimination must conform to the
exceptions regime for human rights established by international law. It is true that
some details vary between regimes, and that the implementation of the standards
identified proceeds at a different pace and under varying circumstances across the
regions and systems examined. Yet, it is equally true that the international human
rights framework applicable to net neutrality is, by and large, uniform (if not
precisely the same) around the globe.
This question of why the existence of universal standards matters is especially
significant in light of the retrenchment in the United States of net neutrality
protections, which are moribund after the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC)’s repeal of the Obama-era 2015 Open Internet Order that notably embodied
those very standards.215 On February 1, 2019, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
heard oral arguments in the case of Mozilla v. FCC, No. 18-1051, the consolidated
action in which a consortium of state attorney generals, internet industry
organizations and companies, and civil society organizations are suing the FCC for
repealing the 2015 Order that enacted strong net neutrality protections in the United
States.216 Many believe the case is headed to the Supreme Court regardless of its
outcome in the D.C. Circuit.
The petitioners in Mozilla claim that the 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom
Order that went into effect last June said protections should be overturned because
it constitutes an “arbitrary and capricious” agency action in violation of the FCC’s
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Rules Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,738 (Apr. 13, 2015); 47 C.F.R. pts.
1, 8, 20, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-04-13/pdf/2015-07841.pdf.
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legal mandate.217 Though many of their arguments are technical, the concerns
motivating them are not. They fear that in the absence of meaningful net neutrality
rules, ISPs will abuse their unchecked power over fixed and especially mobile
markets to throttle or even block content to the detriment of users and public safety;
they also fear the effects of the unfettered use of paid prioritization on competition,
innovation and mobile broadband pricing.218
Central to the debate playing out in Washington D.C. around the FCC’s repeal
of net neutrality in the United States is the question of impact: what, exactly, is the
harm it will cause? In the absence of rules governing blocking, throttling and paid
prioritization, how will the actions of the ISPs, which include companies like
Comcast, Verizon, and AT&T, affect users’ Internet access and online experience?
Harms to competition and innovation are hotly contested by the parties. In addition
to the debate around the repeal’s economic effects, another area of concern relates to
public safety. Much has been made of Verizon’s throttling of California firefighters’
“unlimited” data plan while combatting the rampant wildfires there last August.219
The evolving standards for net neutrality discussed in Parts I and II are relevant
to these debates among U.S. policy makers and shapers for several reasons. First,
these standards provide a clear framework for better understanding and combating
the threat that a “net without neutrality”220 poses to the enjoyment not just of
economic opportunity and consumer rights, but of fundamental human rights as well.
The human rights framework highlights the impact of net neutrality protections on
social and political rights in the United States, especially freedom of expression,
including media pluralism and diversity; non-discrimination and minority rights;
privacy; and the ability to participate effectively in democratic society and
government.221 Furthermore, the application of human rights-based standards means
that competent international forums are able to evaluate the United States’
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compliance with its international law obligations in this regard. It is not difficult to
foresee the U.S. being brought before regional or international human rights
authorities for failing to protect net neutrality and for any harmful consequences that
may result.222 Any such body could find that such a failure generates State
responsibility for (among other things) not fully guaranteeing freedom of
expression.223
A second reason universal net neutrality standards matter stems from the
potential trade related consequences of going out of sync with trading partners in
Latin America and especially Europe, where robust protections prevail. As I have
observed elsewhere, the United States is bound by the WTO’s General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS), and has additionally signed on to the Basic Agreement
on Trade in Telecommunications Services (BATS), committing it to regulating its
telecommunications services on the basis of several principles that are essential to
net neutrality.224 In particular, the BATS enshrines the United States’ commitment
to ensure that “interconnection” in telecommunications services, including Internet
service, be provided to service suppliers from other WTO Member States on
nondiscriminatory terms.225 In theory if not in practice, its volte face on net neutrality
has left the United States exposed to the risk of a WTO complaint by other WTO
member States with strong protections in this respect on behalf of any disadvantaged
service suppliers.226
A third reason for why we in the United States should care about universally
recognized standards is that, not that long ago, the US was in the forefront of
progressive normative developments in this area. The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet
Order (now repealed) contributed positively to shaping the world’s understanding of
how a State could regulate net neutrality effectively. It was widely admired outside
the US for balancing strong protections with a flexible approach to regulation that
took into account commercial and user practices. As such, the 2015 Order served as
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a model for other countries engaged in the process of developing enlightened
regulation.227 It is no exaggeration to say that, on topics of Internet regulation and
policy, the eyes of the world’s legislators are on the US, following closely what it
does and does not do. Unfortunately, in the net neutrality arena, the US is for now
leading a race to the bottom when it comes to (not) enacting rights-respecting
regulation. But the outcome of the Mozilla case, or eventual Congressional action to
legislate on the subject, may well alter the country’s direction once again in this
regard.
A fourth and final function of universal standards in the U.S. legal and policy
contexts is that they can act as a bulwark against “definitional slippage.”228 If and
when the time comes to reconstitute the net neutrality protections lost in this country,
the existence of such standards could prove helpful to preserving the basic
definitional and operational parameters once enshrined in the 2015 Open Internet
Order. At a minimum, universal standards should make it more difficult to regulate
or legislate beneath a normative “floor” of basic elements when these have been
recognized and established through the widespread transnational and intergovernmental practice documented here.
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